The Sense of Self
The idea that a “sense of self” pervades ordinary conscious experience appears to have at least an intuitive appeal for a number of authors in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Furthermore, several authors have even argued in recent years that a minimal kind of sense of self or self-awareness is necessary for consciousness – in other words, that a creature cannot be in a conscious state if it lacks such sense of self. This conference aims to investigate the very notion of sense of self, which is notoriously elusive and polysemous, in order to bring some clarity to these discussions; furthermore, it intends to bridge the gap between conceptual and experimental approaches to the notion.
Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Olaf Blanke, Frédérique de Vignemont, Shaun Gallagher, Marie Guillot, Jakub Limanowski, Thomas Metzinger, Anil Seth, Manos Tsakiris
The conference was awarded a major grant from the Mind Association, as well as grants from the Ertegun Scholarship Programme, Magdalen College and Merton College.